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Plato's Conception of Rhetoric. 
Although what is now taught in our schools and col-
leges differs considerably from what Pl ato understood by 
the term,there is,nevertheless,in his criticism of it, 
much which the modern student can take to heart and ap-
ply aptly to h is own discourse. However before he can un-
derstand and apply to his own day what Plato has to say 
about rhetoric,he must have clearly in his mind the dis-
tinction between ancient and modern rhetoric. 
According to the modern concept1on,the rhetorician 
is the one who reads literature searchingly in order to 
find the great principles which lie behind and govern 
the production of successful writing or speaking,and,if 
he be of the teaching sort,from these principles to 
form rules which will aid the Y?ung author in expressing 
his ideas to the best advantage. The rhetorician is in-
terested in rhetoric as a science primarily,for,in his 
quality of rhetorician,he is not himself a ~roducer;he 
is the scientist,the critic,and the teacher. Beside 
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this conception of rhetoric,there is the popular idea, 
entertained by those who speak of "mere rhetoric" con-
temptuously as though rhetoric were divorced completely 
from reason or even intelligence,and were only a matter 
of mere words. They would identify it with the p~oduction 
of brainless literature which has only diction or style 
to recommend it. This latter view is not .important,how-
ever, except for comparison. In all essentials,rhetoric 
is now r~garded as the science of expression by .means 
of words. 
To Plato,rhetoric was,on the other ~and,'the actual 
expression in words. This exp~ession was,moreover, lim-
ited to vocal ~leading in the law courts and in public 
assemblies,and,inci~entally,to teaching young men the 
tricks of the trade. In ancient times the rhetorician 
. . 
was the orator, the teacher .of oratory, and only inci-
dentally and _superficially,the theorist. In order to 
teach at ~11,he must of course have had some inkling 
of theory,must have inquired · somewhat into the reason 
why certain effects could be gained in certain ays. 
Their sole acquirements in this 11ne,1f' we can judge 
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from Plato's whole treatment of the Sophists, seem to · Vol. I 
Phaedrus 
have been a few merely formal rules and tricks performed P. 477 
by rather superficial means. Of the real causes which 
lay beyond lasting effectiveness, of the fundamental 
principles, they appear to have known nothing. We find 
then that the ancient rhetorician was the practiser of , 
an art, and that the modern is concerned with searching 
for the principles which make the art of expression suc-
cessful, that he is the scientist who discovers the laws 
and lays down the rules, but who refuses to be responsi-
ble for the working out of them. The only point they have 
in common is that of teaching, a point which is not very 
essential. It can easily be seen, therefore, that this 
sharp distinction makes the application of Plato's 
-
thought to our own times somewhat difficult, and will re-
sult in the discovery that much of what he says is not 
applicoble at all. Our task will be to separate all that 
he says about the practising of the art (which will not 
interest the present day rhetorician) from what may be 
considered the fundamental and real principles which he 
lays down. 
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Before trying to find something of value to him, 
the modern rhetorician must first clear away certain 
confusions and contradictions which he finds in Plato's . 
dialogues - confusions, the na.tural result of his being 
the first to write philosophically of an art, and con-
tradictions which can often be explained when one re-
members that the dia 1 ogues are the result of a whole 
lifetimej during which a man should have the privilege 
of changing his views to fit his changing experienceso 
In the first place Plato's opinion of the field of rhet-
oric varied greatly. Usually it was confined to the pop-
ular view already given of the ancient rhetorician, but 
frequently, partly because of Plato's passion for syste-
matization and generalization, and partly because ocas-
sionally, for the sake of argwnent, he would include 
more, it was broadened. ' In his narrowest moments he 
limits it to the speech-making of his enemies, the 
Sophists;again he calls rhetoric the art of disputatious 
or persuasive discourse, ar-d in the "Gorgias", although 
distinctly admitting that rhetoric is the~ art whose 
tools are words, he excludes from it the speech of math-
Vol.I 
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ernaticians and physicians in explaining their sciences, 
because their persuasion was of the sort which gave truth 
and not belief only. Sometimes he does not make this ethi-
cal distinction, saying curiously enough in the same dia-
logue, "Is not rhetoric, taken generally, a universal art 
of enchanting the mind by arguments: which is practised 
not only in courts and assemblies, but in private houses 
also, having to do with all matters, great as well as · 
small, good and bad alike." And again he says, "The art 
of disputation, . " which he has identified with rhetoric, 
" then, is not confined to the courts and the assembly, 
but is one and the same in every use of language." In 
the Gorgias, either in a mood of displeasure with all 
literature or else of unusual toleranc~of rhetoric, Plato 
includes all discourse whether written or spoken, poetry 
or conversation under the term " a sort of rhetoric." 
The fact that he pretty consistently excludes his own 
dialogues from rhetoric even when he calls rhetoric the 
art of disputation suggests a principle which may explain 
these apparent contradictions. When he was in a less dis-
criminating mood, or else a more thoroughly critical and 
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captious one, he seems to have lumped all expression by 
words under one head and said what he had to say about it. 
At other times, however, he seems to have discriminated 
-between self-conscious and spontaneous expression, or 
rather, perhaps, between words studied with a view to 
creating an effect and words spoken sincerely in an effort 
to seek the truth without selfish design. In the latter 
class of course he put his own art of questioning and 
drawing forth an answer, in the former the despised per-
formances of the Sophists and demagogues. 
His view of the value of rhetoric varies almost 
as reatly because it varies with his opinion of its field. 
When he limits rhetoric to the speeches of the Sophists, 
he is most bitter in his criticism of it; when it includes 
all disputation he is tolerant if not admiring, when it 
includes poetry he is even enthusiastic in his earlier 
dialogues. He says somewhere there is no disgrace in writ- Vol.I 
Phaedrus 
ing, merely in bad writing. Finally however, in the Repub- P. 465 
lie, he exiles all rh~toricians , as all poets 1 excepting 
,,,tJ 
only those who tell straightforward narrative and give 
A \\J d 
simple exposition, a::s those who talk quietly exchanging 
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ideas. 
Throughout almost all his dialogues, he confuses 
the art with the artist and condemns the one because the 
other is so bad. Because the Sophists who were the chief 
practisers of the art of rhetoric, were ignorant trick-
sters, insincere and selfish, he is unwilling to believe 
that rhetoric may be anything but ignorant, selfish and 
insincere. In cne dialogue when a rhetorician,~arddriven 
by Plato's dialectic , tries to take refuge in saying that 
-the art should not be condemned because some men have 
made a disgraceful use of it, Plato quibbles to establish 
his point that the very fact that a bad use might be made 
of it was proof that the art was bad. True, however, in 
the Gorgias he makes a distinction between good and bad 
rhetoric in the following, 
Vol.II 
Gorgias 
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11 I arr: contented with the admission that rhetoric Vol.II 
Gorgias 
is of two sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgrace- P. 394 
ful declamation, the other which is noble and aims at the 
training and improvement of the souls of the citizens, 
and strives to say what is best, whether elcome or un-
Melcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a 
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rhetoric, or; if you have, and can point out any rhetori-
cian who is of this stamp, who is he?" 
Plato admits that there might conceivably be a noble rhet-
oric, but, because there are no noble rhetoricians, he 
maintains that none exists . He still refuses to distinguish . 
between the art and the artist . 
But because modern rhetoric is what it is, the mo-
dern student must make this distinction for himself if 
what Plato has to say about rhetoric is going to help him 
any . He must carefully separate what is merely bitter cri-
ticism of particular men at a particular time from what 
has significance for all men at any time . In the light of 
this distinction, Plato's unsettled idea of r.hat consti-
\...e.'5'!:! 
tuted the theory of rhetoric becomes 1rl::s important , and 
his uncomplimentary conception of its value loses a great. 
deal of its significance, loses meaning in direct propor-
tion as that meaning depended upon the character of the 
rhetoricians . 
If this distinction is carefully kept in mind, the 
modern student will find a great deal to learn about rhet-
oric, for since Plato's ideals are high, and not only that 
\ 
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but often practical, he demands a great deal from rhet-
oric. He deals with it from two standpoints, the more 
formal side and that pat>t which js concerned more partic-
ularly with the thought. 
Of the more formal side of rhetoric Plato has less 
to say, for he is opposed to the tyranny of many small 
rules which he seems to think, distract the mind of the 
author from the contemplation of the whole, the expres-
sion of which is the only justificatimn%iscourse. Never-
theless he allows to pass without comment the remark of 
a certain Prodicus who says that he has discovered the 
whole art of rhetoric to be the rule, " let your dis-
course be neither too long nor too short but of a con-
venient length." At first thought this rule 8eems as 
vague as the modern dictum that the paragraph should be 
' of a pleasing length, dividing the page into so many 
parts that the reader need not be frightened away by an 
I 
appearance of too great solidity. Of long speeches Plato 
through his mouthpiece Socrates, is frankly and continu-
ously scornfUl, although he himself sometimes occupies a 
great deal of space as he admits in the following quota-
Vol. I 
Phaedrus 
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tion from the Gorgias: 
·" I may have been inconsistent in making a long 
Vol. II 
speech when I would not allow you to discourse at length. Gorgias 
P. 347 
But I think that I may be excused because you did not un-
derstand me, and could make no use of my answers when I 
spoke shortly, and therefore I had to enter into an expla-
nation. And if I show an equal inability to make one of 
yours I hope that you will speak at equal length, but if 
I am to understand you, let me know the benefit of your 
brevity, which i's only fair." 
But it is the lonr speech which says nothing, the ram~ 
bling talking for the sheer love of it,nnd not for the 
information which one conveys to which Plato objects. He 
urged the Sophists to be brief, because, being brief, 
they might be more pithy. If it were never abused, this 
rule would never draw the mind of the audience from con-
templation of the whole; there would be no verbiage, no 
"fine writing", no superfluous graces to make people think 
"how well done", rather than-"how good a thought!" But 
if the rule were observed too carefully the whole might 
be inadequately and too scantily expressed. It might even 
-1]-
be falsely represented if the thirst for brevity went so 
far as to demand epigrams. But against this abuse of a 
good rule Plato ould warn us in the quoted passage from 
the Gorgias, and by his own continual practice of makir-g 
a speech long enough to gain its end. 
Not dissimilar to this rule is another which Plato Vol. I 
Phaedrus 
lays down in the Phaedrus, " he repeats himself, Socrates P. 439 
criticises the manuscript hich his friend has been reading 
" two or three times, either fro ant of ords, or from 
ant of pains; and also he appeared to e ostent tiously 
to exult in sho ing ho ell he could say th same thing 
into or three ays." Repetition, th n, in those days as 
now as caus d by three ays: lack of vocabulary, un ill-
ingness to exercise sufficient care, and the desir to 
gain a certain effect, hether of emphases, clearn ss, or 
beauty. The third motive for the use of repetition Plato 
apparently considers affect d and unfor ivabl , though 
its successfUl use as considered one of the special er-
its ~~ ~iscourse. Pure reason might perhaps agr e 1th 
SI Ge 
him,~r pure r ason and a good memory one statement of a 
fact or an idea ould be quite sufficient, but the av rage 
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human mind is not made up of pure reason, and has a far 
from perfect memory. Plato reckoned without his psychol-
ogy. If you are going to wear a stone away with water or 
break it with a hammer, you must assail it with many drops, 
beat it with many blows; and so with the mind, persistent 
t-e pQf1noh ~i th~ idea 
is necessary to produce any effective comprehension of 
" the idea, as any school teacher knows. Plato himself con-
tinually uses the device in his dialogues to press home a 
seet1 
thought to his audience, as can be~n this passage from 
the Phaedo. 
"when you say that Simmias is greater than Socra- Vol.II 
Phaedo 
tes, and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias P. 248 
both greatness and smallness?" 
" I do. " 
11 But still you allow that Simmias does not really 
exceed Socrates, as the words may seem to imply, because 
he is Simmias, but by reason of the size which he has; 
just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is 
Simmias any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but 
because he has smallness when compared with the greatness 
of Simmias." 
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"True." 
" And if Phaedo exeeds him in size, this is not 
because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness 
relative to Simmias who is comparatively smaller?" 
" That is true . " 
" And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and 
is also said to be small, because he is a man between 
t.he.w., exceeding i..lle sIUallness of one by l.tis gL·eatness, 
and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his 
smallness." 
Plato would probably say that the same principle 
held true here as in the rule regarding length of speech-
use whatever is needed to make ypur idea clear, and to 
drive it home. Used otherwise, the excellent device 
would develop into a mere trick of rhetoric performed 
when there was no psychological need, merely for the joy 
of playing with words . It may become , instead of a means 
of conveying thought, a pretty way of hiding the lack of 
it, of leading the heare~s mind away from the discovery 
of how vacant the speaker's mind really is. This illegit-
imate use of a good device is, I take it, what Plato 
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condemns. 
Although Plato seems to resent repetition, feeling 
apparently, that one statement of a truth is enough, he 
is willing to admit by constant use of it, the advis+abil-
ity of another means of forcing home an idea to the reader, 
namely, that of illustration. In the Phaedrus, Socrates 
agrees that the speech of his companions and himself has 
been too abstract and wiJlingly consents to point his re-
marks with illustrations. In almost all of his dialogues 
he constantly quotes lines from Homer, Hesiod, and other 
poets, he frequently bares his arguments even upon an 
allegory. Although he does in no place explicitly give 
to this method of proof by illustration authoritative 
utterance, his constant use of it ought, surely, to be 
taken as sufficient assurance that it is one of his rhe-
torical tenets. Plato used two forms of illustration, 
that of analogy with the well known matters of every day 
life, and, that of the myth. The analogies he draws from 
every occupation known to the Greeks- mathematics, animal-
breeding, carpentry, medicine, cooking, and others, and 
most of them are used with very good effect. The myth 
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used figuretively to prove some difficult poi~t,or to car-
ry Plato over some otherwise impassable placein the argu-
ment is more poetic and attractive aesthetically, but is 
weak in knowledge. As Zeller says, " when Plato i fl these 
cases adopts the mythical representation, he indirectly 
confesses that his ordinary style would be impossible to 
him. His myths are consequently not only a proof of his 
artistic ability, and an effect of the intimate relation 
still subsisting between his philosophy and his poetry, 
but they betray the boundaries of his methodical thought • . 
However admirable in themselves, therefore, they are in a 
scientific point of view, rather a sign of weakness than 
of strength . " 
"Plato and 
the older 
Academy". 
Pp. 162-3 
Edward Zell 
translated 
Sarah Franc 
lleyne and 
lfred Good 
win. 1876 
f p.1<.0-1 
Concerning the selection of material, Plato says Vol . I 
Phaedrus 
little that is of importance . There are, he tells Phaedrus P. 440 
certain facts which must appear in every discussion of an 
idea no matter which side the author takes. These funda-
mental and undeniable truths correspond to the "common 
ground" of debate, truths which both sides admit, truths 
. 
which cannot be contested, but of which each side makes a 
different use . Frivolous commonplaces must not be used as 
-16-
the matter of rhetoric, mere twaddle, on the lips of all 
in the market place, and having no bearing on the serious 
import of one's discourse • . Hippothales in the "Lysis" for 
instance, wishing to praise his young friend, is rebuked 
for enumerating his many ancestors and for giving an ac-
count of the wealth of the young man's family. The young 
writer is forbidden the use of trite themes and worn out 
fields, though emphasis ought to be laid on freshness of 
manr~er and treatment rather than on novelty of material. 
Much more important than any of these, as Plato 
thinks, is the rule for definition of terms about which 
there may be dispute, more important because it has more 
to do with clear thinking which Plato believes to be the 
greatest method of gaining all good. For instance, Plato 
/ 
../ says that, when one speaks of gold and iron, he need stop 
for no explanations because gold and iron carry the same 
idea to every man, and to stop needlessly to elaborate an 
idea already perfectly understood, would be absurd. But 
when one comes to speaking of justice, goodness, or love, 
he is on extremely debatable ground. Justice, love, good-
ness- each means something different to each man, and be-
Vol. I 
Lysis 
P. 51 
Vol. I 
Phaedrus 
P. 470 
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fore a speaker can make any headway at all in a speech a-
bout them Jhe must be careful to define sharply his own 
conception. This defining of terms requires>first of all, 
clear and accurate thinking on the part of the speaker, 
for before one can define a position accurately he must 
have that position clearly outlined in his own mind. Its 
value is greater than this, for in addition it is condu-
~ 
C1ve to clear thinking on the part of the audience, and fS 
essential to their intelligent comprehension of the sub-
1'n e. ject, It provides a check on bombast, fine writing, and 
" 
sentimentality which often are made possible by confusion 
of te1~s and the lack of a check or restrain~. 
When Lhe proper ma"t.8r.i.al is gained, and the terms 
are well defined, Plato cares little about formal rules 
of speech. He sums up the rules generally accepted by the 
rhetoricians of his day, which required that a speech 
should be divided into exordium or introduction; the state-
ment of facts and the witnes!' the proofs; probabilities; 
~ 
confirmation; refutation; and recapitulation. But, although 
he seems willing to accept the general outline, his tone 
is contemptuous when he speaks of too great adherence to 
Vol. I 
Phaedrus 
P. 475 
-18-
rules. Once gi~en the thought, clear and original, and an 
accurate definition of terms, ·the form would adequately 
care for itself, was Plato's belief. 
To provide for clearness and accuracy of thought, 
Plato has two principles which correspond roughly to unity 
and coherence, and which demand the logical processes of 
generalization and division. Broadly speaking, generaliza- Vol. I 
Phaedrus 
ti on works to attain the effect of a whole, its duty is P·. 474 
to systematize a number of particular and to find what 
lies behind them and binds them together. This is peculiar-
ly characteristic of Plato, this searching for unifying 
principles, this pass·ion for finding the oneness which is 
obscured by numerous particulars. It is the essential 
principle of his whole philosophy and the most significant 
tJ.%6 principle which distinguishes his philosophy from 
that of Socrates. To work, according to its demands, the 
writer must find a thought large enough to embrace all 
the scattered ideas he has in mind; the descriptive writer 
.> 
trying to draw a picture of someone, must select some cen-
tral impression and make every detail count towards the 
developement of that. To the thinking writer or speaker, 
-19-
the reading about recent disasters in coal mines and 
many cases of consumption amongst textile workers will 
immediately bring the thought of "dangerous occupations 
or of responsibility of employers . " It does not mean a 
straining effort to find some external connection between 
two ideas merely for the purpose of hasty composition. 
Having two ideas in his mind, neithe~f which is ca able 
of developtment into a theme of the required length, the 
writer is encouraged to look about madly for some exter-
nal link between them. There might be some legitimate re-
lation between these ideas Jbut this torturing way of go-
•S 
ing about it to make a connection to order1unpsychologica~ 
and valuable chiefly as an exercise in mental gymnastics. 
WP' ~T•V-
What Plato's principle should inspire the young 1\'lth is 
"' th ~ iLe to search for the definite expression of the 
vague, unifying thought which is actually in his mind,al-
though not vividly present in the field of his attention. 
This conception of unity differs considerably from 
that which is most co~.mon in modern text books. In modern 
thought,unity is usually regarded as a cutting-away pro-
-20-
cess rather than as a building-up one. The writer is con-
ceived to have in his mind. the whole idea plus a number 
of excrescences which must be removed:he has a pan of gra-
vel from which he must wash the gold dust. This,too,is a 
necessary conception,and is perhaps more practical formal-
ly; but it is terrifying to the young writer.,whose thoughts 
are pitifUlly few and thin at best,to be told that he must 
cut half of them away . Plato's principle is more organic, 
and better because it encourages the brain to assist in a 
growing process,and puts the emphasis more on constructive 
thought. 
It might,however,be possible to think constructive-
ly enough 'to see the unity behind a whole world of partic-
ulars ,and still to be considerably confused about the or-
der and arrangement of the particulars as particulars. 
This difficulty is arranged for by Plato in his laying 
down of a second principle which is more specific,though, 
perhaps,not so widely applicable as the first . Be has Soc-
rates define it, 11 The second principle is that of division Vol.I 
into species according to natural formation,where the Phaedrus 
joint is,not breaking at any part as a bad carver might," P.474 
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and go on to say further that he is a great lover of 
these processes of division and generalizations whioh,he 
finds ,aid him greatly both in speaking and writing. This 
is the principle which provides more for clearness and 
orderliness than for philosophic thought;this is th~ 
principle whioh,as Plato thinks, renders unnecessa:rw 
many minor rules for order and arrangement in the actual 
writing, for, _once ideas are clearly marshalled in a 
writer's mind, they cannot fail to be presented clearly, 
and in proper order. ·ow coherence, although still main-
taining its plnce in thought, and while still insisting 
on the su~remacy of thought, includes the manner of pre-
sentation, all the minor relation of words and sentences. 
It has more to do with the formal side than Plato ~ould 
have considered necessary. 
This principle at its best is most used in ar men-
tative and expositive literature, for in these the ~ub­
jects are most adapted to scientific classification and 
cool an~lysis, and thought is uppermost and chiefly es-
sential. In poetry, where reason holds the minor place, 
and the emotions are of the greatest importance, it is 
-22-
more difficult to analyse and arrange, but even here, is 
permitted no helter scelter profUsion of details and rhap-
sodies . Order must reign, even in poetry and in the emo-
tional life . 
When Plato is discu~sing these principles, his scorn 
of rhetoric as he saw it, is very great, and he denies 
that these processes are a part of rhetoric at all. That 
this denial was based somewhat, on the conduct of the 
contemporary rhetorician is scarcely to be doubted, but 
it brings up an interesting problem. If it is the duty 
of philosophy to teach the student how to find the unity 
of things beneath the weight of particulars, and if, as 
we can scarcely doubt, it is the province of the logician 
to teach clear and orderly thinl{ing, what, then, is the 
province and duty of the rhetorician as a teacher? Plato 
would leave him none. But one might say that that was 
the rhetorician's opportunit~ to encourage laboratory 
work in logic and philosophy . 
Next in the thought Plato demands knowledge, know-
ledge of two sorts, first in material, and second psy-
chological understanding of people. This is quite char-
Vol.I 
Phaedrus 
P. 480 
.... , ·· .. 
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acteristic of Plato because he held knowledge to be the 
virtue of virtues and the parent of all that was desir-
able. In the Phaedrus, Plato asserts that even if the 
object of rhetoric should ·Je to deceive men, the rhetori-
. 
cian must have a form of knowledge, that is a keen per-
ception of likeness and difference, because it is by a 
subtile passing from likeness to difference, from truth 
to falsity that deception is accomplished, and if a man 
be not familiar with these, he is liable to blunder in 
the passing. If a pleader in the court room desired to 
prove that a certain thief was innocent of the charge of 
theft, he would have to know the law very thoroughly in 
order to persuade the judges to belie re the man's con-
duct had been quite flawless. He would start with the 
"like", that is , he would begin by showing where the 
man's character was good, and from that, by impercepti-
ble degrees, proceed to the "unlik~", the apparent proof 
that even his wrong acts were good. The rhetorician, if 
he intends to deceive, must know all things, must under-
stand the nature of all things, for only in so far as he 
does have perfect knowledge, can he be sure of his foot-
'. 
. vol.I 
Phaedrus 
P. 470 
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ing ·when he is gliding about on such slippery ground. Al-
though as the dialogue proceeds Plato comes to the conclu-
sion that bad and ignorant rhetoric can convince only ig-
nor~nt people, still he insists that the truly sucessful 
rhetorician, the man who talks to sensible people must 
have knowledgeo Without it, he could convince thinking 
people of the truth of his views. Plato would let the 
perfect rhetorician off with nothing short of certain 
.knowledge of all things. If the rhetorician knew all, he 
would no longer be rhetorician only, but physician, ship-
wright, _ arithmetician; every trade would be his, every 
science, every art. Such a treasure house of virtue 
could be only in the brain of Plato's philosopher-king, 
hence the philosopher is the only perfect rhetorician. 
But practically, to have any one man who is omniscient 
is impossible, says Plato in the Republic. 11 And whenever 
anyone tells us that he has found a man who knows all 
the arts, and all things else that anybody knows, and ev-
ery single thing with a higher degree of accuracy than 
any other man-whoever tells us this, I think that we can 
only imagine him to be a very simple creature who is like-
Vol.III 
Republic 
P. 331 
ly to have been deceived by some wizard or actor whom he 
met, and whom he thought all-knowing because he himself 
I 
·was unable to analyze the nature of knowledge•" 
If one accepts Plato's dictum that the rhetorician must 
have thorough knowledge, he must look for possible modi-
fication or compromise. On ri!•st thought, the most feas-
.ible plan would seem to be that of di vision of labor 
(Plato himself suggests it in the RepubliQ in connection 
with something else when he planned the ideal state). 
Let each man gather knowledge as befits his nature and 
ability, and let him from the firm foundation of that 
knowledge speak and t.each and writeo But here again we 
have no place for the rhetorician as rhetorician, for 
the intelligent man will not go to any but the special-
ists w}\en knowledge is so highly specialized. Plato has 
said again ~hat there might be a worthy rhetoric-hut 
there isn't. And the rhetorician is still roaming about 
seeking for a foothold. 
There is another sort of knowledge which he must 
,.. 
have, a knowledge not of things now, but of people. 
Plato puts this thought into the mouth of Socrates, 
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''oratory is the art of enchanting the soul, and therefore 
he who would be an orator has to learn the difference of 
human souls-they are so many, and of such a na~ure, and 
from them come the differences between man and man. 11 The 
rhetoriaian works with people somehow as the sculptor 
with his marble, or the potter with his clay. As these 
know what they can do with the different varieties of 
clay and marble, so must the rhetorician understand the 
personalities of those to whomhe makes his appeals. He 
must understand that the sort of speech which may be 
particularly winning to one person may entirely alienate 
another from his cause. And he must be so clever in de-
tecting character and in .applying the right sort of speech 
that he can give one glance at his hearer and straitway 
choose the tone which vrill conquer him. It is not enough, 
however, to know the personality of the . individual; that 
is no curious or unusual accomplishment. The real test of 
the ability of the or~tor-rhetorician comes in his know-
ing mob-person~lities. To be able to stand before a great 
mass of people, each with a different personality, and in 
spite of their differences, still to be able to find the 
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experience has required of him only that he adapt his 
words to the intellect of his auditors. But suppose that 
a pestilence is raging in the country, a dread plague 
for which his new remedy . is the only cure, and that the 
people, say ignorant foreigners, are suspicious of any 
one who cannot speak their language, sick, afraid, and 
crazed with terror, refused to be treated. Before he can 
teach or explain, he must first soothe fright, soften an-
ger, and overcome suspicion; mus~ appeal to their ' emotion 
before he addr esses their brains. 
When this understanding of psychology becomes too 
superficially a matter of the mere emotionalism, or be-
comes insincere and too dependent on what the audience 
thinks, Plato's tone is contemptuous. Speaking of such 
a superficial rhetorician he says: 
"But when he understands what persons are persuaded 
by what arguments, ~nd sees the person about whom he was 
speaking in the abstract actually before him, and knows 
that it is he, and can say to himself, 'This is the man, 
or this is the character who ought to have a certain ar-
gu,~ent applied to him in order to convince him of a cer-
Vol. I 
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tain reason;• - he who knows all this, and knows also 
when he should speak, and when he should refrain, and 
when he should u~e pithy sayings, pathetic appeals, sen-
sational effects, and all the other modes of speech 
which he has learned:-when, I say, he knows the times 
and reasons of all these things, then, and not till then, 
is he master of his arts." 
When the rhetorician's psychological hold on the 
people is tempered and governed by reason, Plato has 
words of approval for t.~e man who _ kno~s his audience. But 
he must be logical. As Plato says; "Unless a man estimate 
Vol.I 
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vide all things into classes, and to comprehend them un-
der single ideas, he will never be a skillful rhetorician 
even in the limits of human power. 11 Thin sets a difficult 
task for the rhetorician,and makes his labor arduous. He 
must by no means trust to the charms of his personality 
to give him power to know how best to present his know-
ledge to different people: he must not be content, like 
popular heroes, to when his audience with mere smilingo 
He must understand thoroughly the workings of their very 
souls, the natures of all their virtues and vices. He must 
not have faith in the unaided thinking of a fairly coher-
ent mind; he must labor unceasingly to train it to think 
with exactness and precision, and to grasp essenti~ls, 
that he may attain coherence and philosophic unity . From 
this difficult labor no man will shrink who is really in 
earnest,for it only in so working that he may hope to 
find his speech acceptible in the eyes of God . This 
and this alone, is the true beginning of rhetoric-to 
speak words which are approved by the Knower of all. 
The way the orator affects other people then, is after 
all, of no consequence unless God desires them to be 
affected . 
Plato's attitude towards truth is curious and vari-
ed . One of his quarrels with the speakers of his day was 
founded on what he felt to be their pers.istent and braz-
en disregard for the demands of ·truth. It irr~tates him 
profoundly that they should confessedly prefer to tell 
a lie which sounded probable to giving utterances to a 
. . 
truth which sounded like a falsehood. There actually 
seems to h"ve bee::i. a rule whic 1 ~~e the observw-.ce of 
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the law of probability throughout a speech one of its pe-
culiar merits. Against this ingenious argumentJPlato spoke 
continually with virtuous indignation. But his own regard 
for truth was not always without reproach. In the first 
place he didnot care very much for truth as represented 
by facts, for in his dialogues he violates all sorts of 
facts regarding time place and characters; and moreover 
he introduces myths which, . so far as facts are concerned 
are merely pretty fabrications. Even where truth has a 
I e. great deal greater significance, Plato would bele:Jrve in 
suppressing it on occasions. In the "Republic", hen 
planning an ideal state, he would banish the poets be-
cause they wouls persist in telling unwelcome truths a-
bout great men. If Achilles sulked in h · s t,enC J ike R 
m1.·tl~i1ty cld lt1, the kno le 1ee of hlA defect:l n must be 
kept from children lest they think that they,too, are 
permitted to sulk without restraint. If Ulysses was dis-
honestly crafty, if a grea ... general lacked self control, 
if a ruler lost his temper violently-all these things 
were to be suppressed, and none was to kno • The poets 
were not allowed to represent human nature as sad, as 
Vol. III 
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sorrowing, as passionate, or as down-rieht wicked . 
Children might imitate the faults of heroes rather 
than their virtues if their vices were permitted to be 
known. Instead the youth was surrounded by representa~ 
~ions o~ perfect men that. they might themselves become 
perfect , Plato had no real faith in the moral power of 
truth; truth was to be regarded with susp~cion until it 
proved itself beneficial morally. This is the only dif-
ference between ~is disregard of the trut~, and the Soph-
ists scorn of it, that Plato would rather have it than 
not, providing only he thought it morally purgative . 
The whole end and aim of any sort of rhetoric, must 
be moral, according to Plato . 
1,1 
•he orator must not only 
say what is ~leasing in the sight of God, and suppress 
truths which might give his audience a suspicion that 
there were bad habits they might acquire, but he was to 
work positiv~ly and actively to make his hearers good . 
No good poet, says Plato in the "Lysis", could poss.ibly 
be conceived as injuring either himself or another. The 
moment he harmed anyone, he would cease directly to be a 
good poet. In the 0 Lesser Hippias'' , we are told that 
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the Iliad is better morally than the Odyssey because 
Achilles is more virtuous than Ulysses, the crafty. In 
the "Republic" we see the poets banished because they 
gave the people harmful notions about the gods, and 
because the moral welfare of those who took delight in 
them was so totally disregarded. Art as art for art's 
sake, Plato refused to tolerate; discourse must be more 
in the nature of a trap or a sermon, at least it must 
be literature with a well defined moral purpose. Just 
as the physician cared for the good of the body, ref'us-
ing it things which were merely pleasant an.1 flat ter•Jng 
to the taste, and giving it only medecines which were 
curative, so the perfect rhetorician would watch over 
the we~.l-being of the soul,. giving it medicinal dis-
course, and prohibit~ng any flattering appeal to its 
less lofty appetites, refus~ng everything which was 
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Lesser Hippi 
Vol.III 
Republic · 
P. 60 
not condusive to its health. He will not aopeal to the Vol.I 
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vanity of the people , nor to their desire to be flatter- P. 479 
ed and pleased: he wilJ not deceive them , telling them 
now one thing, now another, until their poor minds are 
quite distraught and rendered incapable of coming to an 
b 
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decision or mak~ng any judgment; he will not corrupt 
their minds wi tr1 t ales of licentious gods and pusillan-
imous hero·e s; he will not stir them up with emotions 
which come to no more use than distroying their courage 
and sapping their manliness . The wise and noble rhetori-
cian will rather lead his audience as a shepherd does 
his flock, carrying for them with a more than paternal 
anxiety ; he addresses them for their own good , not for 
their delight nor his own; he teaches them; unshaken by 
their clamor to be praised and to be permitted to think 
well of themselves, he tells them truths, even though 
they be unwelcome; he will describe, setting befo~e them 
as models perfect gods and flawless heroes, that their 
minds may be uncorrupted by weakness, their souls, un-
tainted by vileness . 
So far there has seemed to be very little differ-
ence between the ideal rhetorjcian and the ideal philo-
sopher; both must understand completely the nature of Ule 
human soul, and both must have comprehension of the whole , 
and ability to classify logically, ~nowledge, love of 
the truth, and a high moral purpose . The rhetorician, as 
( 
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as an ideal,seems _mere.y to come i~to contact with peo-
ple somewhat more,and to talk more. But to differentiate 
them further,curiously enough,with more honor to the po-
et and the orator,we have Plato's theory of inspiration. 
If we take what he says fo~ its fact value,we have the 
curious situation of the ideal rhetorician being identi-
cal with the philosopher in everything except inspiration 
which he had as an extra boon from the @ods,everything 
that the philosopher-king is,with this additional in-
timacy with,and favor of ,the supreme ruler. To find that 
he has so honored the rhetorician and poet,makes us sus-
picious of Plato ~and m~kes us ask sharply whether he can 
be speaking in e~rnest,or whether he is not being merely 
cleverly satiric. Bearing in mind,however,his continually 
expr~ssed belief that the_ ideal rhetorician is an ideal 
only,we can perhaps accept what he says about inspiration 
as gravely as anything else ~e seems to . say in favor of 
rhetoric and poe~ry. Oratory,he says,is,in its perfection, 
a gift of nature. One must first hav~ the gift before the Vol.I 
training will assist him appreciably. The true poet,and Phaedrus 
thl true rhapsodist (that is the t~ue appreciator of the P. 478 
poet) are inspired by God,and are themselves in no wise 
responsible for their productions. In the Ion,where he 
talks with a young rhapsodist who claims to be the great-
est living interpreter of Homer, and who says that only 
Homer interests him at all. Plato very adroitly shows 
that the interpreter lacks real knowledge, renl thought, 
and real understanding. He can go into a frenzy and look 
very foolish, but that is all," Well, Ion," Socrates is 
made to say drily, " What are we to say of a man who at 
a sacrifice or a festival, when he is dressed in holiday 
attire, and has golden crowns upon his head of which no-
body has robbed him, appears weeping or panic-stricken 
in the prescence of more than twenty thousand friendly 
faces, when there is no one despoiling or wronging him; 
- is he in his right mind, or is he not?" Plato then 
flippantly c,m. ares the poets in the frenzy of their 
composing, and rhapsodists in the madness of their inter-
pretation to Bacchantic revellers at their insane orgieso 
Furth~rmore he pres~nts the ridiculous picture.of Muses, 
poets, interpreters, and their populace eager for culture 
depending one group from the other like steel shavings 
and jron ri~gs from a magnet. The Muses make the poet be-
,, 
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side himself and fill him with inspiration; the poets in 
their turn are like demons in possession of the rhapso-
dists who, in their turn, perform before the people un-
til both they and the spectators are beside themselves. 
And all are crazed by the inspiration, originally,given 
by the Muses. By reason of this inspiration, poets work 
without regard for rules of art or reason; their outlook 
is very limited because they are capable of composing on-
ly abo~t those things for the sake of which they are in-
spired . One poet wrote but a single poem of worth, be-
cause his insipration went no further. Had his production 
been the result of painstaking thought and clear-eyed 
ph~losop~y, he ~hould not have needed to be so restrain-
ed . True, Plato, in one place calls a "light and winged 
and holy thing" and asserts that "many are the noble 
words which poets speak concerning the actions of men," 
but he still regrets their lack of solid thought. The 
character of Ion, the young rhapsodist, was so affected , 
however,and so pretentious, that the flippant tone of 
h,. 
the whole dialogue may be just in rebuke of him and1 1cin d 
Vol . I 
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rather than in scorn of real poetry. In the Republic" 
in spite of the fact that Plato is banishing the poets, 
his attitude towards Homer is regretf'Ul and tender. 
Probably he merely wanted everyone, even the favorites 
of the gods to come under the discipline of dialectic 
thought>and saw no reason why a ·poet should not be sane 
as well as the rest of mankind. 
Stripped of all philippic against the particular 
rhetoricians of his particular time, Plato's arraignment 
stands with three counts against the theory of rhetoric; 
first that it appeals to the love of pleasure, one of the 
lower desires of mankind; second that, instead of presen-
ting realities, it presents images and imitations of the 
real; a~d third that it arouses false and undesirable e-
motions. 
For the aim and attitude of rhetoric, Plato has 
nothing but scorn. True he flings an occasional pleasant 
II h word to the poet, calling him sometimes the fat er and 
author of all wisdom" and referring to the works of Hes-
iod and Homer with a semblance of respect, but that is 
only by way of satiric jesting, like the occasional un-
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enthusiastic compliments one gives the guest who has out-
stayed his welcome . Ile has continually referred to com-
position as the art of "enchanting men's minds" . In the 
Gorgias he ' analyzes this thought and developes a theory 
which is very degrading to rhetoric . He berrins by analyz-
. ing man, dividing him roughly into body and soul. For the 
good of these parts there are t wo arts which administer 
to their well being . For the body, there is that art which 
made up of· gymnastics and medicine; for the soul, there 
is intellectual activity divided into what Plato calls 
"i egislative"and "justice", meaning perhaps concrete ' 
thought translated into deeds, and abstract contemplation 
and inquiry~ end 11 flattery", the idea i:mi t nting each and 
presenting the frauds to the view as being much more 
wholesome than the orie;inals. Something which is named by 
Plato"tiring"and which apparently includes all the arti-
ficial beautifying arts such as wig-making, rouge-making, 
the contriving off lse .hair and similar devices , takes 
the place of gymnastics. Instead of the fine condition of 
body which is the result of exercise and fresh air, this 
art of tiring gives to the lazy body a false bloom and an 
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~rtificial symmetry, concealing all defects under subtle 
draperies. The distinction between this "tiring" and gym-
nastics is obvious to us moderns because of the spreading 
of the gospel of open air and bodily exercise, but the dis-
tinction between medicine and cookery, which Plato says 
is the counterfeit of medicine, demauds interpretation. To 
the T.odern view, cookery would seem to be more wholesome 
than medicine. Plato's use of terms however, appears to 
have a different meaning from ours. To him, medicine did 
for the body everything which gymnastics was unable to do: 
it was the surgeon's knife; the antidote for poison; the 
taking of wholesome elements into the system. That portion 
of our cookery which weighs and apportions food-values and 
takes care to provide a rational and health-giving diet 
would be, in 
degraded are 
Plato's view, medicine. So much will show how 
. w h~ch 
the false arts pander to the body, and will 
A 
show in what esteems Plato held the corresponding arts of 
the soul which we~e sophistry and rhetoric. Rhetoric then, 
as Plato bel~ves, aims only to flatter the mental and 
moral·palate of him who hears or reads its products. It ·1s· 
not that Plato has any quarrel with all pleasures, it is 
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only sentimental gratification which he considers bad.The 
pleasure which the ideal rhetorician could give· to the 
wise and sane would be admirable, and much to be desired. 
The foolish audience should be preserved from be ing de-
bauched by the unworthy masters of rhetoric. 
The next quarrel that Plato has with rhetoric or 
comp?sition as a whole is one which he considers very ser-
ious. It is concer ned with the reality of the ideas which 
we are offered in writing or speaking. A poet may describe 
a bed, but he cannot give s the real bed; he can only give 
us the image of an image of the bed. For, as Plato explains 
at length in the Republic, Everything which we perceive 
with our senses is but the shadow of the ideal thing which 
the Great Creator has made. Hence when one reads he is get-
ting thrice weakened effects. His own ideas are so much 
the more at variance with the pattern which the Creator 
has made. In like manner, perhaps, are the emotions and 
truths which tbey depict or at least those which they sue-
• ceed in impre s sing upon the reader s mind, unreal a1:d not 
worth tl;te. get ting, All are shadows too far removed from 
" 
reality. 
This brings us closely to Plato's third quarrel 
with rhetoric in which he says that the emotions arroused 
are undisirable if not positively bad. This is applicable 
part~cularly to imitative writings, that is, that litera-
ture, such as the novel and the drama, which deals with 
the joys and tragedies of author-created people. One reads 
a heart-rending tale, and weeps with pity and wrath, but 
both pity and wrath trickle away with the tears, and the 
emotion never comes to fruition in deeds. This weeping 
Plato scori:is, 11 The best of us," he has Socrates say,"as 
I conceive, when ~e listen to a passage of Homer or one 
of the tragedians, in which he represents some pitiful 
hero who is drawling out his sorrows in a long oration, 
or w~eping and sm'ting his breast, the best of us you 
know, deli ht in giving way to sympathy, and are in rap-
tures at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feel-
ingsmost. But when any sorrow comes to us then you may 
observe that we pride ourselves on the opposition qual-
ity- we would fain be quiet and patient; this is the man-
ly p::-.rt". That manly part he fears we should lose if e 
indulged too often in weeping over pictured griefs. 
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One wishes that Plato had stopped, himself, to 
clear away contradictions and confusions, and to develop 
some of his ideas so ful~y that there need e no ruis-
take about their meo.niLlg. Somf! of the thoughts which need 
to be developed are: his theory of repetition about which 
one would like very much to know whether he understood 
the psychological principle hich demands rep~tltion, 
and whether he was protesting against the sentimental use 
of it; his conception of . the choice of material; and sev~ 
eral of the minor points. His theory of unity leaves "too 
much to the imagination, a good illustration and a more 
detailed explanation of the way to go about letting one's 
thought grow would be very valuable. In his discussion of 
knowledge Plato demands too much, as he himself admits, 
and fails to see that fairly exhaustive knowledge of a 
r easonable number of subjects would serve the purposes 
of a finite life better than omniscience. O e ould be 
puzzled where to begin speaking id he has all knowle ge 
to choose from. And in his demand for kno led e of the 
audience he fails to distinguish bet een a sort of in-
3tincti ve knowledge which is more a matter of personal-
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ity, and that real knowledge which can be gained by study 
and thought. 
Plato's discussion of the truth is most unsatis-
factory and contradictory. First of all, although he 
himself uses ·different standards in .hi's practise, he 
fails definitely to recognize the need. · For different 
forms of literature are demanded varying standards of 
truth. For expositive and argumentative speaking and · 
.writing, for histories, scientific discussions, and all 
informational literature, the standard of truth is fact·s • 
.. 
If such literature should not have this sort of truth, 
it's value is lost . To the poet, fiction-writer, and the 
. dramatist are given great leeway in their use of incidents; 
they may fabricate what they will; but they must not vi-
olate the laws of human psychology, must not teach laws 
of emotions and which cannot be proved in experience of 
actions • .tioreover, Plat<;> is, I think, deceived about the 
ethical danger of truth. Can truth be harmful in the eye 
of a philosopher? How ought heroes to be 'portrayed? 
Heroes are after all nothing but men who have'k'l&t ade• 
rpiately and beautifully some very difficult situations. 
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Being men, they must have men~s weaknesses, pettiness, 
and even vice, to some degree. Are we to omit from our 
hymns of praise to these men, a half of the truth which 
is no less true than the praiseworthy half, because for-
sooth, our youth should have only impressions of grace 
and beauty about them? The insipid, thoroughly virtuous 
youth of the Sunday School library volumes is not so ef-
fective an agent for reform to set before a boy as Arthur 
Pedennis, weak and stupid though he was . I like better 
the philosophy of the oL testament which places before 
our eyes men with quite as much of the animal nature a-
bout them as the ct4vine, There we can see how flesh can be 
t ~ 
redeemed from its grossness and made to serve great and 
lofty en~s, and we can feel some hope for our own imper-
fections . If David had been always the phonomenally pure 
and virtuous shepherd lad on the throne, and had never 
lost his ideals in the complexity of later life, ho 
could we hope that our youth might count in the end? All 
truth is good if only its moral value be adequately ex-
pounded and understood. Plato failed to see that the audi-
ence must have some share in the moral responsibility; 
- o-
they cannot be merely sheep. 
About the same criticism can be made of Plato's 
demand for m·oral purpose. The . reader and the audience 
ought to share responsibility. It ignores too thoroughly 
the share of the reader in the question, and does not re-
member that what will harm one person may prove a great 
moral benefit to another. To take a modern instance "The 
Easiest Way" a play recently presented, had two distinct-
ly opposing effects; sorae found the heroine alluring, and 
her manner of life attractive; others were warned from 
the downward path more effectively than they would have 
been by any tract or sermon. Would Plato call Eugene 
Walter, the playwright, a noble dramatist or an evil? We 
canr+ot judge, by the author's purpose, any morals except 
his own. If he meant to do good , then he was good, but 
that does not settle the question fqr the thousands to 
whom his appeal will be made. It might be unphilosophical 
but would surely be more practical, to compromise on the 
question, demand a certain standard of decency, and be-
yond that allow the writer or ~peaker full rein. !:et the 
public have strong'meat to eat, if they are going to grow. 
l,'lDr 
It isAlikely to be the coddled infant that grows up most 
virile. 
15 
Plato's conception of the noble rhetorician~too 
vagueJStoo little differentiated from the philosopher • 
. 
He was to have the same knowledge, the same love of truth-' 
the same moral purpose; _he was differentiated solely by 
the idea of inspiration, an idea which Plato may not 
even have meant seriously when he wr&te it down. The 
reason for this confusion is Plato's unwi llingness to 
place great value upon form, which really must be the 
rhetoricians p~rticular province, the only one which he 
does not share. Plato took for granted that if one thought 
clearly, he could write or speak sufficiently well. But 
that is not necessarily true. One could hardly write ell 
without all the essentials which Plato insists upon, but 
he mi ht write or speak very unattractively, and still 
have them all, lacking only a se~se of form and style. He 
left beauty out of consideration. And this is strange 
because he considered beauty one of the forms of the 
highest go?d, and pleasure in it would be surely be 
legitimateo 
When he scorns rhetoric for pandering too much to 
more or less low pleasures and tastes, he forgets the 
possibilities of a noble rhetoric, and confine himself 
too closely to his own day. He recognized the practical 
necessity of making ideas appeal to the audience, and it 
seems curious that he did not realize that the pleasure 
giving power of literature is the chief method of appeal. 
It cannot be denied that pleasure ought not to be the 
sole aim of literature, but one ought to admit that it is 
at least one legitimate aims, particularly when its pres-
ence is necessary to produce any effect at all. 
As to his criticism that a poet does not give real-
ity, it might .be contended that since the only perfect 
things are the patterns, the ideas, the bed which the po-
et gives us, proceeding from an inspired mind, mi ht be 
much nearer the pattern than the shadow which we call 
reality. If the author is really serious in his aims and 
conscientious, nay lofty, in his ideals, his interpreta-
tion of reality is likely to be more real than that 
which the people, blinded by self-interest, can know. 
There would be no question about thisif e were permitted 
to take the theory of inspiration seriously; for the mind 
·1·•hich was filled with ideas straight from God would give 
much truer images than those which the ordinary man could 
make for himself. 
These objections, notwithstanding, Plato has a great 
deal to contribute to the theory of rhetoric. In the first 
place his position is sound as regards the minor matters 
of length, repetition, and selection of material, and his 
demand for clear definition of terms about which there is 
some dispute is very .valuable, particularly to the expos-
itor and the debater. His theory of coherence is unassail-
able and essential to any oort of ~orthy production. His 
principle of unity is peculiarly valuable because it is 
constructive and organic, and will aid in the development 
of ideas. His demand for knowledge, if heeded, will pro-
vide fundamental interest to any literature, and ~ive 
the groundwork for all other charms. Since most express-
ion is expression to someone, then it is very fitting 
that the author heed Plato's advice and know his audience 
As a check upon the possible evils·of this, coming for 
instance to be enslaved by the limitations of the public 
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we have Plato's insistence upon moral purpose and respon-
sibility to God. fuOreover he has given us in his warning 
against unreal emotions and false appeals to sympathy, 
an important remedy for over-sentimentalism. h 
